The Financial Consequences of Rating International Institutions: Competition, Collaboration, and the Politics of Assessment

Abstract

Abstract The past 15 years have witnessed a striking trend in global governance: the creation of comparative indicators of the performance of international institutions by donor states seeking to allocate their resources more efficiently. Interestingly, however, not all highly rated institutions have been “rewarded” with increased contributions, while not all poorly rated institutions have been “punished” with funding cuts or freezes. I argue that the financial impact of performance indicators is contingent upon the relationship between institutions and other actors within their environment, with stronger effects occurring when institutions (1) are subject to a higher degree of resource competition and (2) possess deeper and more extensive operational alliances with actors above and below the state. I test the argument using a mixed-methods strategy that draws on a variety of original sources, including key informant interviews and a new dataset covering fifty-three institutions over the period 2000–2016. The findings enhance our understanding of when and why comparative performance indicators influence resource flows to assessed entities.