Sharing Saddles: Oligarchs and Officers on Horseback in Egypt and Tunisia

Abstract

Abstract Research on the military's removal from politics overemphasizes the attitudes and interests of officers. Civilians are portrayed as incapable of confronting refractory men with guns. This essay compares regime transitions in Egypt (2011–2013) and Tunisia (2011–2014) to show that unified civilian elites strengthen and polarized elites undermine civilian control of the armed forces. Research for the cases is based on interviews with Egyptian and Tunisian businesspersons, party members, and civil society activists; the International Consortium of Investigation Journalists's tax-offshoring database; loan disbursements from the IMF and World Bank; and secondary sources in Arabic, French, and English. The cases reveal novel insights about the military's removal from politics in fledgling democracies. Pleasing Egypt's officers did not shield President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood from a coup in July 2013 because Morsi and the Brotherhood threatened the wealth and power of civilian politicians and oligarchs. In Tunisia, Islamist and non-Islamist political and economic elites pushed democratization for fear of another Ben “Ali-style kleptocracy. Even during crisis in 2013, united civilian elites contained opposition calls for army intervention. The study's findings suggest that democratizers are not at the mercy of soldiers, but rather civilian leaders have the power to sideline their armies.