State Compliance and the Track Record of International Security Institutions: Evidence from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Abstract

Abstract Why do states choose to comply with international security institutions, and what factors drive changes in compliance behavior over time? This article argues that these institutions are based on a fundamental bargain among members—each is willing to comply only so long as others do—but there is often uncertainty about the compliance of others. The track record of the institution provides information that helps to resolve this uncertainty. As time passes with few violations, states will be more likely to comply themselves; evidence of increasing noncompliance, on the other hand, will make states more likely to cheat. Analysis of data on nuclear weapons programs from 1968 to 2010 finds that members of the nuclear nonproliferation regime are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons when there have been a greater number of recent violations of the regime. These findings point to a more dynamic view of international security institutions than has generally been recognized in the literature.