Personalism and Negotiation during Civil Conflicts

Abstract

Abstract Under what conditions do authoritarian regimes negotiate with the rebels and accept mediation during civil conflicts? While extant literature on autocracies and conflicts has demonstrated that personalist regimes are most likely to experience both interstate and civil wars, scholars have paid less attention to how civil conflicts unfold under these regimes. Meanwhile, the characteristics of the state fighting civil conflicts can profoundly influence the battlefield dynamics, the state's willingness to negotiate, and the involvement of third-party actors. However, extant research on civil war negotiation and mediation has not identified the specific types of states that engage in negotiations. Building on research in authoritarian politics and wartime negotiation, I build a theory that connects personalist regimes with negotiation and mediation during civil conflicts. I argue that personalist regimes are more likely to negotiate with the rebels due to their low military effectiveness and high level of policy flexibility. The repressive nature of personalist regimes and their lack of credibility make bilateral negotiations more difficult to occur, increasing the probability of third-party mediation. Using comprehensive data on authoritarian regimes and civil war negotiations, this article finds support for these arguments.