Initiative and Military Effectiveness: Evidence from the Yom Kippur War

Abstract

Abstract Scholars investigating the sources of military capability have located sources of effectiveness in the structure of the international system, the characteristics of states, and features of the armed forces engaged in battle. They also point toward the likely influence of individual-level variables, but such claims tend to lack theoretical and empirical justification. We advance the literature by investigating whether individual initiative—that is, actions taken by soldiers and junior officers to achieve their commander's intent while in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise—systematically conditions armed forces’ performance on the battlefield. We develop a theory connecting individual initiative with military effectiveness, highlighting the role of “problem-solving” in facilitating the use of men and materiel in battle. We then assess the empirical validity of our claim through an examination of a uniquely informative episode in military history: Israel's fight on the Sinai front during the first three days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The case allows us to hold constant a wide range of potentially confounding variables and, to the best of our knowledge, conduct the first systematic investigation of the impact of individual initiative on the performance of units engaged in combat actions. Our findings suggest individual initiative does have systematic effects on armed forces’ effectiveness in combat. Implications and directions for future research on the development and use of military capabilities are briefly considered.