The Myth of the “Poor Man's Atomic Bomb”: Knowledge, Method, and Ideology in the Study of Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

AbstractChemical and biological weapons (CBWs) have often been characterized as a “poor man's atomic bomb”: a cheap and easy to acquire alternative to nuclear weapons that is particularly appealing to so-called Third World states. This idea is also reflected in Western government and expert estimates that have long exaggerated the spread of CBWs, especially among states in the Global South. In this article, I break down the ways in which the idea that the spread of CBWs is prevalent and that it primarily happens among states in the Global South has come to exist and persist. By dissecting an oft-cited dataset on CBW spread, I unravel frequently occurring methodological flaws—such as conceptual confusion, misinterpretation of sources, and a bias toward proliferation charges originating from the US government—that breed and sustain inflated estimates and faulty allegations. Subsequently, I show that a dominant cognitive framework that centers on the metaphorical use of the terms “proliferation” and “poor man's atomic bomb” primes analysts and policymakers to interpret the history and future of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as being characterized by inevitable spread, particularly among the non-Western “Other.” In conclusion, I offer ways to counter the orthodoxies of this ideology in teaching, research, and policy.