The Impact of Commercial Military Actors on Armed Conflict Termination, 1990–2010

Abstract

Abstract For several decades, the rate of civil war onset has outpaced the rate of conflict termination leading to a “relentless accumulation of ongoing civil wars” (Brandt). The deployment of commercial military actors (CMAs), i.e., private military and security companies and mercenaries, has been considered by some observers as an opportunity to put a halt to this trend, and end a war by writing a cheque. Others are more skeptical and consider CMAs to rather aggravate crises. The argument put forward in this investigation is that a cheque issued early in the conflict facilitates termination, while a later one does not. In the initial state of the conflict, contestants are unprepared to fight, lack capability, and are vulnerable to defeat. However, due to their own weakness, contestants are frequently unable to exploit the opportunity. A CMA intervention early in the conflict can remedy a client's weakness and enable exploitation of the opponent's weakness, and, in turn, conflict termination becomes more likely. The overall results show that CMA intervention within the first year of the conflict is associated with an increased risk of termination as opposed to later or no intervention. The investigation employs Cox proportional hazard models to test the influence of CMAs on conflict termination, and draws on our newly developed Commercial Military Actor Database, which includes PMSC and mercenary deployments in all civil wars between 1980 and 2016.