Holding All the Cards: Nuclear Suppliers and Nuclear Reversal

Abstract

Abstract Do international nonproliferation institutions affect the decisions states make about their nuclear weapons programs? Most studies of nuclear reversal analyze outcomes, rather than decisions. However, states do not uniformly pursue nuclear weaponization but proceed along different paths lined by decisions affecting state resources, research and development, and materials and production. These decisions, which may delay or undermine a program, are critically important to understanding nuclear proliferation processes and outcomes. Using a new data set of non-termination nuclear reversal decisions across three key aspects of program development, I capture more of the process of nuclear reversal. I investigate whether two major nonproliferation institutions, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), influence state decisions about whether to continue investing in ongoing programs. I argue that NSG members have strengthened cooperation across three distinct policy eras and find that the NGS's market controls have generated material constraints that raise the likelihood that states will make nuclear reversal decisions. I do not find evidence that the NPT contributes to reversal decisions within the context of ongoing programs. These findings have implications for the impact of international institutions on state behavior and for counterproliferation policy effectiveness.