A Winning Team of Losers: The Logic of Jihadist Coalitions in Civil Wars

Abstract

Abstract For small groups fighting in multi-actor civil wars, joining a larger coalition is often a way to survive. Yet, it is not only rebel or pro-government non-state armed groups that form alliances; in many cases, jihadists have been surprisingly successful in building winning coalitions in civil wars. This is puzzling because jihadists attract fierce international opposition and are therefore very risky teams to join. Jihadists are also typically excluded from the political process, which means that they are unlikely to enjoy the spoils of a peace agreement. Why then would any local groups choose to join jihadist coalitions, rather than other rebel or pro-government coalitions in a conflict theatre? In this paper, we argue that ideology fails to explain this choice; rather, we contend that competition among rebel and pro-government coalitions inevitably produces winners and losers. Under these conditions, jihadists serve as an attractive spoiler coalition, drawing support from groups that see no chance of benefitting from an existing or future peace agreement. By offering these ‘losers’ a wider network and reference group, jihadists can expand their coalition base and territorial reach. By courting support from marginalized groups across ethnic and tribal lines, jihadists can create a winning coalition out of a diverse mix of losers.