Shaming and Treaty Ratification

Abstract

AbstractDoes shaming affect human rights treaty ratification? Whereas most scholars study shaming’s effects on eventual human rights respect, models of international shame predict states institutionalize rights before behavioral changes become reality. I take a step back and study shaming’s effects on treaty ratification. Viewing shaming as a process that seeks to change behavior by isolating and embarrassing the target leads to a somewhat counter-intuitive prediction—although increasing pressure on states raises a state’s willingness to ratify treaties, too much shame can cause a state to eschew treaty ratification. The argument follows from the social psychology literature on social exclusion that shows isolated individuals retreat from efforts to act normatively rather than increasing their efforts at inclusion. Using data on ratifications of the core UN human rights treaties and an original latent variable measuring shame, I find support for the argument that shaming increases treaty ratification to a point, but then begins to decrease ratification rates.