Affiliation:
1. University of North Carolina , Chapel Hill, NC 27514 , United States
Abstract
Abstract
Largely overlooked in research on criminal legal expansion is the rise of political polarization and its attendant consequences for crime policy. Drawing on theories of intergroup collaboration and policymaking research, I argue that network polarization—low frequencies of collaborative relations between lawmakers belonging to distinct political groups—negatively affects crime legislation passage by reducing information flows, increasing intergroup hostility, and creating opportunities for political attacks. To evaluate this perspective, I recreate dynamic legislative networks between 1979 and 2005 using data on 1,897,019 cosponsorship relationships between 1537 federal lawmakers and the outcomes of 5950 federal crime bills. Results illustrate that increases in partisan network segregation and the number of densely clustered subgroups both have negative effects on bill passage. These relationships are not moderated by majority party status and peak during the 1990s and early 2000s, a period when prison growth showed its first signs of slowing. These findings provide new insight to the relationship between polarization and policy and suggest that increases in network polarization may be partly responsible for declines in crime policy adoption observed in recent decades.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)