A Social Movement Model for Judicial Behavior: Evidence from Brazil’s Anti-Corruption Movements

Abstract

Abstract While studies show that public opinion and educational workshops promoted by nonprofits affect judicial behavior, it remains unclear whether and how social movements affect judges’ decision-making through disruptive actions. I develop a framework to explain the conditions under which and the mechanisms through which social movement mobilization affects the decision-making of judges, drawing on a mixed-methods study of anti-corruption protests in Brazil. I constructed an original dataset of decisions of corruption cases at the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (2003–2016). Results showed that actions that target judicial cases (case-focused protests)—but not protests that simply put the issue on the public agenda—are associated with higher chances that judges will decide in ways that are aligned with the movements’ demands. I supplemented this data with a qualitative analysis of appeals on two investigations of similar crimes and some of the same defendants but with different outcomes in appellate courts: Sandcastle (Castelo de Areia) and Car Wash (Lava Jato). Drawing on 110 interviews with prosecutors and judges and document analysis of criminal charges and judicial decisions, I show that case-focused protests affect judicial behavior through two mechanisms: by threatening the personal reputation of judges and the legitimacy of courts.