Complements or Substitutes? The Interdependence between Coalition Agreements and Parliamentary Questions as Monitoring Mechanisms in Coalition Governments

Abstract

Abstract Since coalition governments are formed of at least two different parties with diverging preferences, there is major potential for shirking. Coalition parties can use various institutional mechanisms to keep tabs on their partners and detect ministerial drifts. In this article, we focus on potential interdependencies between monitoring mechanisms and analyse whether the existence of a coalition agreement affects the number of parliamentary questions (PQs) asked by the coalition partner. We argue that parties can hold the coalition partner accountable to the coalition agreement by asking questions. The more detailed the coalition agreement, the more potential targets exist for focused PQs. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the more detailed the coalition agreement, the more frequently governing parties use PQs as a monitoring tool. Empirically, we rely on a newly compiled dataset on PQs and a content analysis of coalition agreements in Germany between 1980 and 2017. The results confirm our hypothesis.