Affiliation:
1. National Law School of India University, Bangalore, Karnataka 560072, India
Abstract
Abstract
Are anti-defection laws efficient? Many parliamentary democracies have enacted anti-defection laws to prevent frequent government collapses and political instability. Using the anti-defection law in India as a reference, I argue that the party-based anti-defection laws enacted in many Westminster-style Parliamentary democracies do not achieve their goals, yet drastically impact representative decision-making. I show how the entitlements and protections granted by anti-defection laws to political parties and legislators do not achieve the purpose of maintaining government stability and suggest two options to improve it.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Law,Sociology and Political Science
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