The Democratic Case for a Written Constitution

Abstract

Abstract Written constitutions have often been viewed as a bridle for unchecked political majoritarianism, as a restraint on government, and hence as a limiting device rather than form of democratic political expression. Breaking with that tradition, this article sets out a democratic case for a written constitution and contrasts it with the rights-based and clarity-based cases. It then proceeds to show why the case against written constitutions – which is broadly located in a conservative critique, an anti-rationalist critique and an anti-judicialisation critique – is misguided. Nevertheless, a democratic case for a written constitution necessarily raises challenging questions about how the constitution would be enacted, and how rigidly entrenched it should be. In relation to the former, the author argues for a constituent assembly consisting of party and direct citizen representation. As for the latter, he defends a model of entrenchment that permits amendment through a simple majoritarian parliamentary procedure in conjunction with a referendum, and, most controversially, a provision requiring a new constitutional convention about once in a generation. This is the type of democratic constitution, in the author’s view, that accommodates the need for the United Kingdom constitutional order to take both rights and democracy seriously.