The Virtues of Sunset Clauses in Relation to Constitutional Authority

Abstract

Abstract This article focuses on the virtues of sunset clauses pertaining to authority. It examines the utility of such clauses in three instances: first, when there is a transfer of constitutional authority; secondly, when there is an exclusively attributed authority, but it is not exercised; and thirdly, when there is a creation of a new authority. In the case of a transfer of authority subject to sunset clauses, unless such authority is re-authorized, the sunset clause brings about its expiration on a prescribed date. In practice, the benefits from the sunset clause are twofold. First, such a clause allows the comprehensive evaluation of the transferred authority, minimizing the risk of any abuse. Secondly, such a clause sets the timetable, which promotes legal certainty. In the case of inactivity while there is an exclusive authority, the use of a sunset clause as an alarm clock creates an incentive for action; or alternatively, with the expiration of the sunset clause, the authority is considered ipso jure and simultaneously exercised. Finally, in the case where new authority is created, such authority may be subject to a sunset clause if it is implemented as a constitutional experiment or if it is controversial in nature because it possibly distorts the system of separation of powers.