Affiliation:
1. Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge
2. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Abstract
This paper argues that evidential decision theory is incompatible with options having objective values. If options have objective values, then it should always be rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. But, as we show, if options have objective values and evidential decision theory is true, then it is not always rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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