‘Objects’? The Legal Status of Computer Data under International Humanitarian Law

Abstract

Abstract This article discusses whether computer data constitutes an ‘object’, in the meaning of this term under international humanitarian law (IHL). After providing background on what is meant by ‘computer data’, and on the significance of any determination whether computer data constitutes an ‘object’ for the purposes of IHL, the article proceeds to consider the meaning of the term ‘object’ as found in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (API). Recourse is made to the customary rules of treaty interpretation while focusing on both the English and French versions of API. The ordinary meaning of the term ‘object’ in its context in API solely connotes material things, thus excluding computer data. Moreover, recourse to the object and purpose of API, or to so-called ‘evolutionary’ interpretation, does not lead to a different conclusion. Considering the importance of customary international law for states non-parties to API, and for the purposes of non-international armed conflicts, the article proceeds to analyse whether computer data constitutes an ‘object’ for the purposes of custom. The article analyses the development of the term ‘object’ in legal discourse over the past century in determining what states intended this term to mean, and finds that here, too, states considered ‘objects’ in the context of IHL to be material things. It also explains that there is no apparent trend among states as to whether data constitutes an ‘object’, whereas the paucity of official government statements is far from the necessary volume for it to carry particular legal significance.