This chapter considers the moral significance of negligence. It does this by unpacking the complexity of the phenomenon and showing how it illuminates a range of related moral phenomena. Negligence, as I discuss here, is not just a technical legal concept, nor are attributions of it a marginal social and moral phenomenon. Negligence, in fact, is a window into everyday practices behind judgments of culpability, attributions of blame, and allocations of punishment. It is, therefore, a test case for questioning assumptions central to widespread ways of theorizing about moral responsibility. In particular, the chapter argues that, although a general characterization of negligence can be given, a unified account of its culpability is hard to come by. The reason is that negligence comes in a variety of forms that cut across standard criteria to ground culpability for wrongdoing. In the end, some reasons for being sceptical about culpability for negligence behaviour are discussed and found wanting.