Hybrid Governance of State-owned Enterprises

Abstract

Abstract The governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is hybrid in nature as it combines mechanisms of public administration, informal political interference, and standard corporate governance. While researchers often consider social enterprises as hybrid organizations and offer a favorable evaluation of these hybrid characteristics, the similar characteristics in SOEs are oftentimes viewed as their vulnerability. Prior discussions about SOE governance tend to focus on standard corporate governance mechanisms and treat the distinct SOE governance practices as “deviations” from these standard governance mechanisms. By considering SOE governance as hybrid, we bring attention to the existence of alternative governance mechanisms that the state can rely on, such as governance through performance contracts, intermediate ownership structures, and informal influence by politicians. We examine governance hybridity from a variety of theoretical perspectives used in prior research on SOE governance. We also discuss how hybrid governance arrangements in SOEs vary within and across countries. We conclude the chapter with directions for future research on the hybrid governance of SOEs.