Historical Political Economy of Legislative Power-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Historical Political Economy of Legislative Power

Published:2022-08-18 Issue: Volume: Page:C17.P1-C17.S23
ISSN:
Container-title:The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy
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Author:

Cox Gary W.¹

Affiliation:

1. Political Science, Stanford University

Abstract

Abstract This chapter reviews the historical political economy of separating and delegating legislative power in Europe. The separation of power has been a familiar theme since Montesquieu’s (1989 [1748]) Spirit of the Laws. However, the delegation of legislative power predated the separation of power and created durable local governmental units whose successors still exist throughout Europe. This chapter reviews work on the congruence of legislative procedures across levels of government, as well as on the use of separation of power (co-legislation) and delegation of power (especially co-administration) to constrain executive power in premodern Europe.

Publisher

Oxford University Press

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