Kantian Approaches to Ethical Judgment of Artworks

Abstract

Abstract It is difficult to capture a distinctively Kantian approach to the ethical evaluation of artworks since Kant’s own aesthetic concerns are arguably first and foremost about the aesthetic experience of nature, and only secondarily about art. Yet Kant’s theory of the pure judgment of taste (centered on natural objects) does lend some support to formalists and autonomists about art. Somewhat ironically, however, Kant’s own theory of fine art lends support to anti-formalists, moralists, and ethicists about art. This chapter considers a contemporary formalist (Nick Zangwill) and a contemporary autonomist (James Harold) to investigate to what extent their approaches to the ethical judgment of artworks may be justifiably termed “Kantian.” Next, it turns to some wider, suggestive connections that Kant drew between the overall domains of the aesthetic and the ethical. These include Kant’s theory of the sublime and its ramifications for morally salutary art; his view that interest in the beauty of nature (though notably not in art) is the mark of a morally good soul; and finally, Kant’s famous claim that beauty is a symbol of morality.