Derek Parfit’s Non-Naturalist Cognitivism

Abstract

Abstract This chapter concerns Derek Parfit’s development and defence of a form of non-naturalist realism or cognitivism, according to which normative properties exist and must be understood using concepts which form a category of their own, such that they and the facts they may be used to state cannot be explained reductively, in non-normative or ‘naturalist’ terms. After explaining Parfit’s earlier work in metaethics, the chapter turns to Parfit’s On What Matters. His criticism of analytical naturalism, nonanalytical naturalism, and noncognitivism are elucidated. The chapter ends with a discussion of Parfit’s response to objections in four broad areas: metaphysics, epistemology, rationalism, and agreement. The chapter refers throughout to many of the critical responses to Parfit’s views.