Affiliation:
1. Philosophy, University of North Carolina
Abstract
Abstract
In this chapter I explore the explanatory advantages of an expressivist approach to ethics, and the ways in which an expressivist view of ethics should navigate the tricky issues brought up by semantic minimalism. I argue that contemporary realisms either fail to be genuinely theories about ethics, or fail to offer any illumination when they are, and point out ways in which descendants of the sentimentalist tradition of the eighteenth century do better.
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