Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Justice

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter develops and defends the public health-quarantine model, a non-retributive and non-punitive alternative for addressing criminal behavior that draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. It begins by arguing that there are several powerful reasons for rejecting retributivism, not the least of which is that it’s unclear that agents possess the kind of free will and moral responsibility needed to justify it. Section 1 briefly summarizes the arguments against free will and basic desert moral responsibility and explains their implications for the retributive justification of legal punishment. Section 2 then introduces and defends the public health-quarantine model and argues that it’s not only consistent with free will skepticism but that it also provides a more humane, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior than either retributivism or other leading non-retributive alternatives. The chapter concludes in sections 3 and 4 by addressing a number of potential concerns about proportionality, human dignity, and victims’ rights. It is argued that each of these concerns can be met and that in the end the public health-quarantine model offers a superior alternative to retributive punishment and other non-retributive accounts.