Affiliation:
1. Philosophy, University of Graz
Abstract
Abstract
This chapter addresses a theory of intergenerational justice that is referred to as needs-based sufficientarianism. According to needs-based sufficientarianism, the present generation ought to enable future generations to meet their basic needs—for example, their needs for drinkable water, food, and healthcare. The authors’ aim is to explain and defend this theory in a programmatic way. First, they introduce what they regard as the most plausible variant of needs-based sufficientarianism. Then, they argue that this variant is superior to several alternative ways of thinking about intergenerational justice. In particular, they defend basic needs as the currency of intergenerational justice and sufficiency as its principle. Their arguments for these claims do not purport to be fully comprehensive nor fully conclusive. Yet, the authors hope that they suffice to show that needs-based sufficientarianism is a major contender, with significant pro tanto advantages over other views.
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