Hawkes’ Ladder, Underdetermination, and the Mind’s Capacities

Abstract

Abstract At base, cognitive archaeology is in the business of using the archaeological record as an inroad to the abilities and expressions of past human minds. This does important work: explaining assemblages and patterns in the record, reconstructing past societies and people, as well as testing and probing hypotheses about minds and their evolution. However, there is often a long bow to be drawn from material traces to cognition; archaeological interpretation is often underdetermined. Using “Hawkes’ ladder” as a foil and drawing on two cases of Neandertal cognition (mourning and numeracy), this chapter argues that hypotheses concerning cognitive features are not beyond archaeological inference. However, such hypotheses are often “thin”: concerning the capacities of past minds, as opposed to specific meanings or functions. Nonetheless, establishing thin hypotheses is critically important for at least two reasons. First, many productive debates in archaeology are about the cognitive requirements behind specific material traces. Second, establishing thin hypotheses about capacities is often necessary for disambiguating more detailed ideas about meaning and function, or about evolutionary histories, which affords both exploring cognitive possibility and potentially finding ways of testing between these. Inferential strategies in cognitive archaeology then can progressively circumscribe narrower forms of underdetermination, constraining and exploring the space of cognitive possibility.