Affiliation:
1. Philosophy, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Abstract
Abstract
In this chapter, I criticize attempts by Rae Langton, Jennifer Hornsby, and others to apply J. L. Austin’s theory of speech acts to accounts of the wrongs of pornography and rape. There are two main ideas: (a) that pornography is a verdictive or exercitive illocutionary act, and (b) that an assailant can “silence” a victim in their attempt to refuse sex by not providing “uptake.” The chapter argues that the first idea is inconsistent with Austin’s theory of illocutionary acts. The second idea requires a reading of Austin that commits him to a host of counterintuitive consequences. The chapter concludes by pointing out that the normative claims these authors want to make about the wrongs of pornography and rape can be developed and defended without any appeal to Austin.
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