Affiliation:
1. Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter examines the Portuguese electoral system. Firstly, it unpacks its institutional building blocks by examining districts, magnitude, and the electoral formula. Secondly, it examines the historical roots of the electoral system to understand the incentives that led constitution-makers to choose particular electoral rules and regulations. Next, the chapter turns to the consequences of the electoral system. On the one hand, it examines the impact of within-system district magnitude variation for representation. On the other hand, it looks at legislators’ behavioural incentives in light of the electoral system. More specifically, the localism puzzle, that is, why legislators choose to engage in home service in the absence of institutional incentives. Lastly, the chapter looks at the institutional reforms (or lack thereof) of the Portuguese electoral system. The conclusion examines three lessons drawn from the impact of the electoral system on representation and democracy in Portugal.
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