Trading Sovereignty for Self-Determination

Abstract

Abstract Weak or dependent states, especially those with histories of colonial and imperial domination, have traditionally been among the strongest advocates for strict institutionalization and observance of the norm of non-interference. These states are vulnerable to international pressure, and they have sought to limit this pressure by “jealously” guarding their sovereignty. Yet, after decades of advocating for strict non-interference, many have begun to delegate extensive interventionist authority to their regional organizations. What explains this change? I explore this question in the case of the decision by Latin American leaders to compromise on non-interference by delegating authority to enforce human rights to the Organization of American States. I argue that they were motivated by attempts to maintain self-determination and resist the imposition of authority. In making this argument, I extend the definition of self-determination to incorporate self-determination over international rules. I show that existing explanations for this development that emphasize norm diffusion or democratization cannot account for important dynamics. These findings offer evidence that the expansion of regionalism in the Global South has been, in part, a subtle strategy to mitigate the undesirable effects of hierarchy and to create an international system based on respect for self-determination.