The politics of COVID-19 experts: comparing winners and losers in Italy and the UK

Abstract

Abstract This article analyzes the “politics of experts”—or the struggle between scientific advisers to gain visibility and influence—in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy and the UK. Modifying classic studies of policy communities of interest groups and civil servants, we classify relevant policy experts in the two countries into the following categories: “core insiders,” “specialist insiders,” “peripheral insiders,” and “outsiders.” Within these categories, we distinguish between “high-profile” and “low-profile” experts, depending on media exposure. The comparison between the UK and Italian cases helps to identify how actors interpret and follow formal and informal “rules of the game.” We identify a contest between experts to influence policy with reference to two competing “rules of the game.” The first set of rules comes from government, while the second comes from science advice principles. These rules collide, such as when governments require secrecy and nonconfrontation and scientists expect transparency and independent criticism. Therefore, experts face dilemmas regarding which rules to favor: some accept the limits to their behavior to ensure insider access; others are free to criticize the policies that they struggle to influence.