Author:
Wu Juan,Bi Gongbing,Xu Yang,Dang Xiujing
Abstract
This paper focuses on the supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a third-party (3P) seller, and an e-platform, while the 3P seller sells products through the e-platform. If the e-platform not only provides a sales channel for the 3P seller, but also determines the retail price and then sells products directly, we call it e-platform encroachment, which creates price competition between the 3P seller and e-platform. We find that the encroachment benefits the manufacturer and e-platform but hurts the 3P seller. And both the manufacturer and 3P seller prefer the price discrimination strategy to the uniform pricing strategy, while the e-platform does not necessarily. The price discrimination strategy encourages the manufacturer to offer the 3P seller a preferential wholesale price as the compensation and to curb the competitive advantage of the e-platform. The two pricing strategies have the same total sales quantity but different allocations across channels. Moreover, we propose a new coordination mechanism to reduce the double marginalization effect and improve supply chain performance. In extensions, we demonstrate numerically how the e-platform should decide the commission rate and compare the e-platform encroachment model with the manufacturer encroachment model to reveal the impact of different encroachment roles on all parties in the supply chain.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Key Program of the National Natural Science Foundation of China
Subject
Management Science and Operations Research,Computer Science Applications,Theoretical Computer Science
Cited by
4 articles.
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