Abstract
Tourism is experiencing a transformative phase in its development, playing a pivotal role in the country’s economic growth. The potential for further advancement lies in effective tourism management. Recognizing this vital aspect, the present study investigates the application of the M/M/1 queueing model, considering the strategic behavior of tourists in a tourist bus service (TBS) system. A TBS system involves the provision of bus services to tourists, ensuring convenient and efficient travel to various destinations. Understanding the phenomenon of balking as a strategic behavior of tourists is crucial, where tourists strategically decide whether to join or balk based on the queue length, thereby highlighting its impact on the dynamics of tourists’ decision-making. In the proposed model, our attention is directed toward understanding the equilibrium and socially optimal strategies adopted by incoming tourists through a reward-cost structure in the observable queue. This structure allows us to analyze and identify the most effective and efficient strategies for tourists based on the balance between the rewards they receive and the costs they incur. Furthermore, government strategies involve interventions and policies by authorities to regulate and optimize the functioning of the TBS system. These strategies may include the implementation of subsidies or taxes on buses aimed at influencing bus arrival rates. We examine how governmental strategies are employed to identify the optimal bus buffer size objectively, ultimately seeking to maximize social welfare in the TBS system. Through a series of numerical experiments, we aim to unravel the dynamics of the optimal strategies while assessing the impact of varying information levels and TBS system parameters on the overall societal benefit. The ultimate objective is to pave the way for an optimized and more beneficial tourism landscape, fostering positive outcomes in the tourism sector.
Funder
Ministry of Education (MoE), Government of India