Abstract
This paper investigates the quality and pricing decisions in a supply chain consists of one retailer and two manufacturers. The retailer updates the trust value to manufacturers based on the historical information of product quality to determine the actual order quantity. We propose four game models by considering two situations, i.e., manufacturer-dominant scenario and retailer-dominant scenario. Based on theoretical and numerical analysis, we obtain a series of valuable management insights. For example, when a manufacturer with unreliable product quality is the leader and competes with another reliable manufacturer, the retailer’s profit would eventually surpass that of two stronger manufacturers. When the retailer is the leader, the retailer’s profit is often greater when two manufacturers engage in the Stackelberg game rather than that in Bertrand game, and the manufacturer with unreliable product quality can make profit no less than that of another manufacturer with reliable quality.
Funder
Soft Science Research Project of Zhejiang Province
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zhejiang Statistical Research Project
Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation
Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China
The central government of zhejiang province guides local science and technology development projects
Subject
Management Science and Operations Research,Computer Science Applications,Theoretical Computer Science
Cited by
6 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献