Epistemological and methodological aspectes and problems of conceptual debate of fallibilism and infallibilism / Эпистемологические и методологические аспекты и проблемы концептуального спора фаллибилизма и инфаллибилизма

Abstract

Within the framework of the problem of philosophical epistemology and philosophy of science of the 20th century, the opposing conceptual dispute between fallibilism and infallibilism has been repeatedly considered, but in the professional literature it has been discussed for the most part in a very general form and only in the context of some epistemological problems, which does not make a separate consideration of individual aspects of the problem relevant. The purpose of this work is to clarify the epistemological and methodological aspects of the conceptual dispute between fallibilism and infallibilism, as well as the epistemological and methodological significance and problematic nature of each concept. At the same time, in the context of the formulated problem, the problem of conceptual preference is considered, which is understood as the formulation of arguments related to concepts from the epistemological and methodological points of view of the dispute, and the problem of forming a possible specific preference between the concept on this basis. The role of optimistic fallibilism in the conceptual dispute between fallibilism and infallibilism and the formation of epistemological and methodological foundations for solving a number of other problems in the philosophy of science is especially emphasized. To achieve the goals and solve problems, the following questions were formulated: 1. What are the epistemological and methodological problems and arguments of fallibilism and infallibilism in the context of a conceptual dispute? 2. Which concept is more preferable from the point of view of overcoming epistemological and methodological difficulties and problems?