Affiliation:
1. Public Administration Academy of the RA, Yerevan, RA
Abstract
In the article the first price sealed bid auction has been analysed within the scope of mechanism design theory and with uniformly distributed types. The sealed bid auction consisting of two of agents has been observed finding the partial solution to the auction. Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies, the equilibrium state, and the implemented social choice function for the auction have been evaluated. The mechanism has been designed to truthfully implement the social choice function for the auction consisting of two agents. The variables such as the probability of an agent to win, the expected utility of an agent and the expected revenue of the seller have been evaluated.
Publisher
Public Institute of Political & Social Research of Blacksea-Caspian Region
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