Research on Supply Chain Profit Coordination Mechanism Based on JIT Lot-Splitting

Abstract

A supply chain profit coordination mechanism based on JIT lot-splitting, which involves a two stage supply chain consisted of a supplier and a buyer, is discussed. Based on the bargaining power of supplier, the profit coordination with and without incentives are respectively explored. For the total cost minimizations of buyer and supplier separately, two stage stackelberg leader-follower game models, in which buyer is the leader and supplier is the follower, are established. Supplier applies JIT delivery to reduce buyer’s cost and the total cost of the supply chain via dividing buyer’s order per batch into some batches to deliver. Finally, a numerical example and a simulation analysis are given and the impact of the variation of relative parameters on the total cost saving of buyer, supplier and system is discussed. In addition, the efficiency of game decision on the basis of JIT lot-splitting is proved.