Affiliation:
1. Tianjin University of Technology
2. Tianjin University
Abstract
Regional synergy reduction of carbon emissions is an effective means of reducing the total emission.In order to encourage each region to join reduction mechanism,first of all, we should set a reasonable plan about the cost of cooperative emission reduction.This thesis is based on the way of cooperative game to analysis the cost allocation problem of cooperative reduction in the area of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei,and discuss the rational behavior of cooperative reduction in each region. This paper uses Shapley value method to find the solution of the cooperation model, the example shows that the cooperation mechanism is reasonable,so as to verify the feasibility of the regional collaborative carbon emission reduction.And this paper could provide some policy suggestions for regional carbon emission reduction in our country.
Publisher
Trans Tech Publications, Ltd.
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