Abstract
Background: One of the main characteristics of the Ukrainian religious field is conflict between two large Orthodox Churches – Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). These Churches embrace most part of orthodox population and it makes their conflict potentially dangerous for society. The Russian invasion February 24, 2022 makes many problems for UOC because it is considered to be part of state-depending Russian Orthodox Church. As a result, many believers turned their backs on this church, and the state changed its politics toward it rather harshly. But the extent of the changes in belonging to this church remains uncertain and requires assessment. Purpose: To assess the changes in mass self-identification with Ukrainian Orthodox Church in condition of Russia-Ukraine war. Methods: The analysis of statistical data of the moving of religious community in Ukrainian religious field and analysis of data of confessional identification in national representative public opinion polls. Results: Data of public opinion polls show that on the level of identification with the UOC a significant impact was made by large-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022 only. Only in the polls in 2022 there was a significant decrease in the corresponding figure. However, the level of such identification has remained stable even in the situations of the Russian aggression of 2014-2021. Conclusion: Data of public opinion polls show that the large-scale Russian invasion of 2022 has significantly influenced the adherence to and the orientation of the UOC. But at the same time, assessments of such changes, which are making on the confessional identification in these surveys, may be somewhat overstated, and they should be treated with great caution, especially if you base on them a politics in such dangerous area as religion. The UOC has been facing powerful challenges for many years. These challenges have dramatically increased since February 24, 2022, but even now this Church has shown considerable sustainability and the issue of halting of its functioning remains quite conflict-prone, while the benefits from its closing seem rather doubtful. Keywords: confessional identification, confessionals changes, Russian aggression, Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Ukraine
Publisher
Видавець ФОП Марченко Т.В.
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