ANALYSIS OF THE RADIOISOTOPES RECOGNITION POSSIBILITY BY MEANS OF THE ABSORBED DOSE MEASUREMENT WITH DOSIMETRIC DETECTORS OF DIFFERENT DENSITY-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

ANALYSIS OF THE RADIOISOTOPES RECOGNITION POSSIBILITY BY MEANS OF THE ABSORBED DOSE MEASUREMENT WITH DOSIMETRIC DETECTORS OF DIFFERENT DENSITY

Published:2023-06 Issue:1 Volume:3 Page:154-162
ISSN:2786-4553
Container-title:Information and communication technologies, electronic engineering
language:
Short-container-title:ICTEE

Author:

Ubizskii S., ,Poshyvak O.,Zhydachevskii Ya,

Abstract

The work is devoted to the problem of identifying an unknown source of g-radiation as a task of emergency dosimetry in the case of the use for terrorist purposes of the radiation-dispersive devices, known also as dirty bomb. The possibility of identifying an unknown g-source is considered based on the energy dependence of the absorption of ionizing photon radiation, which in passive dosimetry manifests itself as dosimetric sensitivity. Radioisotope recognition is analyzed by the ratio of dosimetric sensitivities of heavy (with a high value of the effective atomic number Zeff) and light (with a low Zeff value) dosimetric detectors, for the values of g-radiation energies of those radioisotopes that can probably be used to create a dirty bomb. As a light dosimetric detector, BeO ceramics is considered, and as a heavy one, a dosimetric detector based on single crystalline yttrium-aluminum perovskite (YAlO3) or lutetium-aluminum perovskite (LuAlO3). The influence of the accuracy of the absorbed dose measurement on the reliability of radioisotope identification is discussed and approaches for its practical implementation are proposed.

Publisher

Lviv Polytechnic National University

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