The problem of the definition of the «transitional judge» in the modern philosophical and legal discourse

Abstract

The article carries out a philosophical and legal analysis of existing approaches to the definition of "transitional justice" and forms the author's position regarding its understanding. Two features of the emergence of the model of transitional justice are singled out: 1) the studied model is built on practical experience, and later became the basis of theoretical studies on transitional justice; 2) this model arises at the initiative of the international community as a reaction to repeated violations of human rights. It was determined that despite the general nature of the definition of transitional justice defined by the UN, many researchers criticize it for the following reasons: firstly, its content does not cover the occasions of changes in political regimes during which human rights were violated; secondly, it does not indicate the admissibility or inadmissibility of using the concept of transitional justice during an armed conflict, or the possibility of its application only after the end of the conflict; thirdly, the definition defined by the UN does not reflect the relationship between transitional justice and international law. The author's definition of transitional justice is proposed, it is a set of tools, processes and mechanisms aimed at overcoming the consequences of human rights abuses in the context of armed conflicts and/or changes in political regimes, which consist, first of all, in bringing to justice those guilty of committed offenses, compensation for damage (as moral and material), establishing the truth about the circumstances in which human rights were violated, achieving reconciliation and establishing justice.