Lines in the Noology of Gregory Palamas. Palamism and Platonism

Abstract

The article traces the main lines of the teaching of mind (noology) by one of the largest Byzantine thinkers, Gregory Palamas, on the material of his treatise Triads (1337–1340). The author considers the question of the foundations of thinking ability according to Palamas. Two paradigms – natural and super-natural – manifested in the noology by Palamas are identified, and how these paradigms are manifested in the topics of knowledge and labor is shown. Different modes of mind functioning in Palamas’ teaching are distinguished: one of discursive thinking, one of self-contemplation of mind, and one of repose of mind. The author analyzes the topic of self-contemplation of mind and shows how this topic is integrated into Palamas’ coherent ontological system: the contemplation of the human mind takes place participating in the self-contemplation of the Divine Mind. The author shows that the seemingly contradictory topics of Palamas’ teaching about mind – the topic of self-contemplation of mind and the topic of repose of mind – do not conflict with each other, but do coexist complementarily in Palamas’ teaching. The author considers the concept of knowledge in Gregory Palamas and distinguishes between natural and super-natural types of knowledge in his teaching. Then he turns to the theme of scientific knowledge in Palamas and shows how Palamas’ view on scientific knowledge leads him to formulating the doctrine of dual truth. The author also identifies two Platonically loaded lines in the Byzantine prehistory of the topic of the self-contemplation of mind: one of Dionysius the Areopagite and one of Evagrius of Pontus. The author ties this Platonic background of Palamas’ noology with the specifics of his understanding of nature of the Tabor light, according to which this light is “intelligent” and therefore cannot be contemplated by beings who do not have an intelligent ability (i.e., who are non-human). The author offers the following understanding of the specifics of Palamite ontology distinguishing essence and energy in God: what distinguishes divine energy from essence is the participability and knowability of energy, but, at the same time, energy exists, distinguished from essence, in the situation of absence of someone who would participate in it and know it as well. The author links this ontological schema with the Platonic background of Palamas’ noology that has been identified above, namely, with the “intelligent” nature of the divine energies that Palamas declares, which, in its turn, is related to the thinker’s idea of the affinity between the divine energies and human mind. Finally, the author identifies essential connotations common to the Platonic “idea” and the Palamite “energy”, and points out the nature of the difference between these concepts.