On the Intrinsic Value of Consciousness

Abstract

Is there value in the instantiation of phenomenal consciousness? While consciousness seems obviously valuable and life without consciousness does not seem to have much meaning to it, further investigation proves otherwise. Some have argued that consciousness may not be as significant and valuable as it may seem. Lee (2019) e.g. endorses the neutral view and argues that consciousness is neither intrinsically valuable nor disvaluable. In this paper, first I critically examine Lee’s (2019) argument for the neutral view. Then I suggest that in order to critically examine the question of whether consciousness is intrinsically valuable without confusing this question with the question of whether it is instrumentally valuable, value of consciousness needs to be considered as the value present in having a viewpoint. I then develop a way of understanding what having a viewpoint is. Lastly, I suggest that if consciousness or having a viewpoint has intrinsic value, it is of an epistemic kind.