Relocating the Problem of Evil: Analysis and Evaluation of A Current Discussion

Abstract

The logical or evidential arguments for the problem of evil, which dominate the discussion of the problem of evil in contemporary philosophy of religion, argue that the existence of God and evil are inconsistent. Plantinga's free will defense refuted the arguments of the logical evil argument and showed that the problem of evil does not cause a logical inconsistency in terms of theism. This familiar course of discussion of the problem of evil is reanalyzed in atheist philosopher James Sterba's book, Is a Good God Logically Possible (2019). In this work, Sterba argues that Plantinga's free will defense fails to show the logical compatibility of evil's existence with God's existence. According to Sterba, the existence of evil, especially terrible evil, and the existence of God cannot be morally justified. To illustrate this, Sterba takes theism's classical arguments for the problem of evil and argues that none of them can morally justify God. In order to make his arguments the subject of a broad philosophical discussion, Sterba makes a special issue in the journal Religions, asking for his arguments to be refuted by theists. A group of contemporary philosophers of religion responds to Sterba on the issue in question. In this study, Sterba's moral evil argument and his criticisms of theism will be examined, and the answers given to him in the journal will be classified and analysed. Finally, a general evaluation will be made for these answers.