Towards an Expanded Conception of Publication Bias

Abstract

This short essay argues for an expanded conception of publication bias. In addition to consideringthe selective publication of results, I argue that we need to also consider the selective publicationof epistemic by-products—observations and knowledge that scientists accumulate incidentallyin the process of carrying out their work. There are three reasons why we should be concernedabout the exclusion of epistemic by-products from the published literature: first, because theyplay an important role in robust replication attempts; second, because their absence can resultin misplaced scientific certainty; and third, because they contribute to a holistic understandingof natural phenomena. However, identifying and addressing publication bias against epistemicby-products and other undervalued forms of knowledge is more difficult than identifying biasagainst quantitative findings. I argue that scientific pluralism and making data publicly accessibleare two potential remedies for addressing this form of publication bias.