Abstract
Despite all “non-market” nature of reciprocal interactions, it would be excessive to deny the invisible calculation of network transfers, that is, the accountability of the given and the received. In this paper, by combining the historical and the logical, the author establishes that there is a rather fine line between the reciprocal exchange and the types of corruptive behavior. The common components relate to the quality of the basis and the background, which indicates the nature and origin of corruptive practices. The exceptional and unique is manifested in different forms of manifestation of the general. The relations of trust, whose meaning is revealed based on the presented tree of the game, act as the general. The forms of manifestation of corruptive behavior have been distinguished by the method of classification. It has been noted that a reliable "safeguard" of opportunistic behavior in reciprocal exchange is a system of strict social standards. If market agreements are ensured by formal sanctions or informal forcible methods, violation of unwritten rules of conduct in the economy of gift exchange is punishable by deprivation of trust, which means excluding the entity that has not lived up to expectations from the network of reciprocal interactions. It has been noted that transaction costs under the conditions of reciprocity are quite low, because the exchange relations are personalized, and the importance of the gift is determined by its subjective value to those to whom the gift is offered. It has been established that on the one hand, the exchange of gifts and incentives within reasonable limits can be a socially acceptable component of successful business relations. However, on the other hand, if a person is authorized to perform state functions, a gift may be offered to him/her for the purpose of bribery and/or incitement to abuse of power. Since the top-down fight against corruption, as a rule, does not affect those stable and dominant stereotypes of public consciousness, standards and values that have been nurtured for decades and even hundreds of years. Thus, when developing policies to minimize corruption, it is recommended to use the methodology and results of research in the field of behavioral economics, which determines the promising areas for research on this issue.
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Co. LTD Ukrinformnauka)
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