Infinite Speed, or the Metaphysical Basis for Deleuzian Epistemology

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this article, the author take cues from Gilles Deleuze’s later works, specifically What Is Philosophy?, reading his and Félix Guattari’s concept of infinite speed through a Spinozist lens. The argument is twofold. First, the author demonstrates that the concept of infinite speed serves as an indispensable condition of possibility for Deleuzian epistemology as a whole. He does so by situating the function of infinite speed in Deleuze’s work alongside the function of eternity in Spinoza’s work, arguing that the former picks up where the latter leaves off—that is, by serving as an epistemological ground. Thus, second, the author argues that despite Deleuze’s critique of and departure from key aspects of Spinozist thought—namely, the category of eternity and desirability of substance metaphysics—the notion of infinite speed, alongside other terms, allows one to read Deleuzian philosophy as a continuation of, rather than a significant departure from, Spinozist thought. Thus, by demonstrating the precise role that infinite speed plays in Deleuze’s later work, the author both illuminates the metaphysical axiom that grounds Deleuzian epistemology and, via this illumination, shows how that epistemology is consistent with and adherent to specific Spinozist philosophical commitments.