Abstract
This article argues that not only are there serious internal difficulties with both Garber’s and later ‘Garber-style’ solutions of the old-evidence problem, including a recent proposal of Hartmann and Fitelson, but Garber-style approaches in general cannot solve the problem. It also follows the earlier lead of Rosenkrantz in pointing out that, despite the appearance to the contrary which inspired Garber’s nonclassical development of the Bayesian theory, there is a straightforward, classically Bayesian, solution.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy,History
Cited by
24 articles.
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4. On the Origins of Old Evidence;Australasian Journal of Philosophy;2019-10-14
5. Statistical Inference as Severe Testing;2018-09-14