Abstract
The laws of nature have an internal explanatory structure. This leads to interesting questions for metaphysicians of laws. What is the nature of this explanation? Marc Lange has recently argued in favor of metalaws: higher-order laws governing other laws, of which symmetry principles may be an example. Lange argues that his view, unlike its competitors, can make sense of the explanatory power of symmetries. I agree with Lange about the explanatory structure of laws but disagree with him about the nature of this explanation. I then present a Humean view that neatly captures the explanatory power of symmetry principles.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy,History
Reference19 articles.
1. Friend, Toby . 2018. “How to Be Humean about Idealisation Laws.” Unpublished manuscript, University College London.
2. Meta-laws of nature and the Best System Account
3. Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion (Twice Over)
4. Empirical Consequences of Symmetries
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