Regulation And Economic Interests
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Published:2011-10-18
Issue:1
Volume:8
Page:135
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ISSN:2157-8834
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Container-title:Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
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language:
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Short-container-title:JABR
Author:
Das Bhaskar Jyoti,Shughart II William F.
Abstract
The capture theory of regulation is analyzed in this paper with the motor trucking industry. The evidence supports the argument that regulation is acquired by industry and is designed and operated primarily for industrys benefit. It is also found that the optimal level of regulation provided by the legislature is less than the outcome most desired by the special interests because of the involvement of the political costs.
Publisher
Clute Institute
Subject
Business and International Management
Cited by
1 articles.
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1. Economics of intrastate trucking regulation: Some empirical evidence;Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review;1997-06